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ABSTRACT 
 
Labour market friction is viewed as the Tobin’s Q of an employed worker 
as opposed to the position of the Beveridge curve. This Tobin’s Q is inversely 
proportional to the average quality of the match between employers and 
workers. Based on this measure, I find that the labour market friction behaves 
procyclically in the US, which is indicative of the fact that firms compromise 
on the quality of the skill match during an expansion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relative price of investment to consumer goods has significantly declined over time in 
the US.   This decline is particularly noticeable in the 80s, which coincided with the great 
period of moderation of output volatility.  A number of papers ascribe this recent decline 
to elimination of investment frictions (Justiniano and Primiceri, 2006, Chari, Kehoe and 
Mcgrattan, 2005).   Although there is a near consensus that the degree of capital market 
frictions in the US has substantially decreased recently, less is known about labour market 
frictions.    
Following the work of   Pissariades (1985), by labour market friction I mean the 
degree of mismatch between the worker and the employer.  Little is known about this job-
matching variable at the aggregate level.   A sizable literature focuses on the behaviour of 
the unemployment-vacancy relationship (known as the Beveridge curve) as a measure of 
this friction.   There are both empirical and theoretical limitations of this Beverdige curve 
approach.  Vacancy is usually measured by the help-wanted index which is less reliable 
particularly after the internet revolution when job openings are mostly available online.  
Valletta (2005) attempts to remedy this deficiency by creating a synthetic job vacancy 
ratio and argues that the Beveridge curve has shifted inward in the 80s after an outward 
shift  in  the  70s.      Shimer  (2005)  argues  that  the  vacancy-unemployment  ratio  has  a 
remarkable volatility (almost 20 times higher than the labour productivity).  This volatility 
makes it difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion about the time path of the labour 
market frictions. 
2    
In this paper, I use a price-based approach to measure the quality of the skill 
match.  A firm’s decision to fill a job vacancy is considered as an investment problem.   
Just like the law of motion of the physical capital, the representative firm takes a dynamic 
Beveridge  curve  as  given  and  then  makes  optimal  choices  about  the  time  paths  of 
employment as well as physical capital. The relative price of a worker with respect to  
capital is shown to be the Tobin’s Q of an employed worker.  I show that this Tobin’s Q is 
inversely related to the average match quality of the worker and the employer. The Q of 
the  worker  shows  endogenous  fluctuations  driven  by  the  TFP  shock.    Parallel  to 
                                                 
2 Hornstein et al. (2005) extend Shimer’s (2005) work and find additional problems in replicating the 
observed unemployment-vacancy fluctuations using the extant matching models.     3
investment  friction,  in  my  model,  more  friction  in  the  labour  market  means  a  higher 
Tobin’s Q of the existing worker.    Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) define labour 
market friction in terms of an implicit tax on wages.  My model differs from Chari et al. 
(2005)  in  an  important  dimension.    While  in  their  model  the  labour  wedge  in  a  real 
prototype model is equivalent to stickiness of nominal wages, in my model, this labour 
wedge is explicitly identified with the quality of the match between  workers and the 
employers. 
I employ a production based asset-pricing model drawing on the work of Merz and 
Yashiv (2006) and Cochrane (1991).   Using a calibrated version of this model, I estimate 
the economy-wide matching probability and find that it is strongly countercyclical. This 
basically  means  that  the  quality  of  the  worker-employer  match  deteriorates  during  a 
boom. This is indicative of the fact that firms compromise on the match quality in hiring 
new employees in a booming economy when the labour market is tight.    
The  plan  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.    In  the  following  section,  I  report  some 
stylized facts about the time series behaviour of the relative price of labour in terms of 
capital. In section 3, a production-based asset-pricing model is laid out to show the precise 
relationship between the labour market friction and the value of a worker.  Section 4 
reports some calibration results. Section 5 concludes.   
 
 
2. Capital and Labour Market Frictions: Some Stylized Facts 
Chari et al. (2005) interpret the input market friction in terms of the relative price 
of the relevant input.  Based on this measure, a decline in the relative price of investment 
goods with respect to consumption goods means a decline in investment frictions.   In 
Figure 1, I plot the ratio of US producer price index of finished capital goods to the 
consumer price index.   Following the oil shock in the early 70s, there is a steady decline 
in this relative price of investment goods, which reconfirms the decrease in capital market 
frictions in the 80s.         
<Figure 1 comes here> 
Motivated by this price-based measure of input frictions, I calculate the relative price of 
labour with respect to capital for the US economy over the period 1948-2001 to arrive at a   4
measure of labour market friction relative to capital market friction.  This relative price is 
measured by the ratio of the annual index of compensation per worker to the producer 
price index of finished capital goods over the period 1948-2001 taking 1992 as the base 
year.  Data for compensation per worker came from Hall (2001) who compiled these data 
from Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS).  The producer price index of finished capital 
goods came from the Federal Reserve St Louis database.    
Figure 2 plots the series.   The relative price of a worker shows a steady increase 
except for the period of the oil shocks during 1973-74 when all producer prices increased.   
<Figure 2 comes here> 
In the next step, I examine the cyclical behaviour of the relative price of a worker.  
I use the total factor productivity (TFP) as an indicator of the business cycle.  The annual 
manufacturing multifactor productivity index is used as a proxy for the overall TFP of the 
US economy.   The data came from the Bureau of Labour Statistics.    Figure 3 plots the  
total factor productivity (TFP) index and the relative price of worker after taking out a 
loglinear trend component from each series.  The cyclical component of the value of 
worker positively correlates with the cyclical component of the TFP shock.  The 
correlation coefficient between these two series is 0.57.   The relative price of worker is 
procyclical.
3  
<Figure 3 comes here> 
  In the rest of the paper, I will argue that this relative price of worker with respect 
to capital can be interpreted as the Tobin’s Q of a worker. The procyclical behaviour of 
this Tobin’s Q is driven by a decrease in the quality of the match between workers and the 
employers during an expansion. This quality of the match is measured by the productivity 
of  the  recruitment  efforts.  As  the  labour  market  tightens  during  a  boom,  firms  start 
compromising on the quality of the match while recruiting. This makes already employed 
workers more valuable to the firm.    Based on this analysis, I will argue that the Tobin’s 
Q  of  a  worker  is  a  reasonable  measure  of  labour  market  friction  as  opposed  to 
unemployment-vacancy ratio.  To make this point transparent, in the next section, I focus 
on the production sector of the economy and develop a simple asset-pricing model.  
                                                 
3 The procyclcial movement of the value of worker is robust to the choice of detrending method. I also 
looked at the correlation between Hodrick-Prescott detrended series for real GDP and the value of worker. 
The correlation coefficient between these two series is 0.50.       5
 
 
3. The Model 
I  propose  a  production-based  asset-pricing  model,  which  builds  on  Merz  and  Yashiv 
(2006).
4   The production sector consists of identical firms sharing the same production 
and investment technology facing a market wage rate, wt whose time path is exogenously 
specified.  The timeline is as follows.  At the start of date t, the firm observes a TFP shock 
t e   and  produces  output  with  the  predetermined  tangible  capital  Kt  and  the  human 
resources Nt using the following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
   
a a e
- =
1
t t t t N K Y               (1) 
 
where a  is the capital share in output.   The firm then disburses the existing employees a 
real wage of wt.  Finally it undertakes two types of investment decisions: investment in 
tangible capital It  and  posting of new vacancy, Vt.  The cost of posting new vacancy, Xt is 
proportional to the number of posting as follows:  
t t aV X = ;       with  0 > a             (2)     
 Investment in tangible capital augments firm’s the physical capital following a standard 
linear depreciation rule:  
t t t I K K + - = + ) 1 ( 1 d               (3) 
where d is the constant rate of depreciation of physical capital.    
Regarding the latter investment, I follow Merz and Yashiv (2006), to postulate the 
following law of motion for the employees:  
t t t t V q N N + - = + ) 1 ( 1 y           (4)   
where  ) 1 , 0 ( Î y  is an exogenous job destruction rate,  and qt is the probability that a 
vacancy will be filled or equivalently it is the match probability between a worker and an  
employer. Alternatively qt can also be interpreted as the quality of the match because it is 
                                                 
4 Merz and Yashiv (2006) use a production based asset-pricing model of the type pioneered by Cochrane 
(1991).  Their innovation is to show that the market value of a firm can be decomposed into the value of 
capital and the value of labour.         6
the positively related to the productivity of a firm’s spending on recruitment.
5 One may 
think of this law of motion as a dynamic Beveridge curve in an employment-vacancy 
plane.
6  The higher the qt, the lesser the friction in the labour market which means that the 
increase  in  employment  will  be  higher  for  a  given  number  of  vacancies  making 
investment in human capital a cheaper option to the firm compared to physical capital.  As 
we  will  see  later  that  qt  is  endogenous  in  this  model  and  determined  by  the  firm’s 
valuation of a worker, which in turn depends on economic fundamentals.       
      
The representative firm facing a constant discount factor r  solves the following 
problem
7: 
 
Max   }] { [
1
0
0 t t t t t t t
t
t I X N w N K E - - -
-
¥
= ∑
a a e r        (P) 
s.t.    (1) through (4) , given K0 , N0.          
 
The TFP shock  t e is specified as a geometric random walk as follows:
8  
1 1 ln ln + + + = t t t x e e                         (5) 
where  1 + t x ~N(0, 2 s ) 
 
 The first order conditions with respect to I and X are as follows:  
I:   [ ] d a e r a - + = -
+ + 1 1 1
1 1 t t t k E               (6) 
                                                 
5 Note that the marginal return to recruitment spending is:  . / / 1 a q X N t t t = ¶ ¶ +   
6 To see it clearly, normalize the labour force at unity (ignore population growth). Then (3) can be rewritten 
in an unemployment-vacancy plane as:  t V t q t U t U - - + = + ) 1 ( 1 y y  where  t U  defined as 1-Nt is the rate 
of unemployment and Vt is the vacancy rate.  This is a familiar dynamic Beveridge curve used in the 
literature (see for example, Nickell et al, 2001).   
7 I ignore any convex adjustment cost in this benchmark model. There is, however, some built in 
adjustment cost of shifting resources from tangible to intangible capital.  The firm incurs a relative price of 
1/qt to switch from tangible to intangible investment.  
8 According to  Prescott (1986) US TFP is a near random walk process while I assume that it is an exact 
random walk.  Banerjee (2001) show that the first order forecast sensitivity due to difference stationary 
specification when the process is truly trend stationary is zero. See also Banerjee and Basu (2001) for a 
related paper.  Moreover, I also performed a unit root test for the logarithm of the TFP series used in the 
following section.  One cannot reject the null of a unit root.       7
X:   ] ) 1 ( ) 1 ( [ 1
1 1 1 1
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where kt is the capital/employment ratio at date t. Given the random walk nature of the 
TFP  shock, it is straightforward to verify that the capital-employment ratio is: 
a
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The first order conditions (6) and (7) can be rewritten in the following valuation 
equation form:  
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where   t t t t
k
t I K k CF - = -1 a a e  and  t t t t t t
n
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Using (10) and (11) one can have the following value decomposition for the firm: 
 
  
N
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1 + =                  (14)   
The  Tobin’s  Q  of  capital  is  unity  while  the  Tobin’s  Q  of  a  worker  is  inversely 
proportional  to  the    match  probability  qt.    This  match  probability  qt  drives  a  wedge   8
between the Tobin’s Q of capital and the Tobin’s Q of labour.  The relative value of a 
worker is defined as the Tobin’s Q of a worker to the Tobin’s Q of tangible capital. This 
relative value is the inverse of the match quality qt.   A higher relative value of a worker 
thus reflects a lower match quality or a greater degree of labour market friction.
9   
 
Define qt
*=aqt
-1
.  Using (4) and (7), one can write the following valuation equation 
for a worker: 
] ) 1 (
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This valuation equation is just like a standard asset pricing equation. The worker is valued 
as an asset to the firm. The Tobin’s Q of an installed worker is typically the expected 
present value of cash flows or surplus arising from his/her continued employment.   This 
cash flow is the difference between worker’s productivity the real wage.    
 
Specification of the Process for Wages 
 
There are two alternative views of the real wage story: (i) sticky wage version, (ii) flexible 
wage version.  Hall (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of this debate and arrives at 
a synthesis. As far as the US labour market is concerned, the punchline of this debate 
boils down to the link between real wage and productivity.   To nest these alternative 
views of the real wage formation, I posit the following process for real wage:   
[ ] q
t t MPL w W =                (16) 
where the parameter  ) 1 , 0 ( Î q captures the elasticity of real wage with respect to the 
contemporaneous marginal product of labour and Wis a scale parameter.   A zero value of 
q  means that the real wage is unresponsive to change in labour productivity.   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 To see why the relative price of physical capital is qt, note from (2) and 3) that the firm has to invest 1/qt 
to augment the number of employees by one unit.    9
 
 
 
 
 
Solution for the Tobin’s Q of Worker 
 
 The key equation is (15) which involves the Tobin’s Q of the worker. Using the method 
of undetermined coefficient, one arrives at the following solution for the worker’s 
Tobin’s Q: 
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The appendix outlines the derivation of (17).   The Tobin’s Q of a worker is basically 
driven by the TFP.  Whether a positive TFP shock increases or decreases the Tobin’s Q 
depends  on  the  how  the  TFP  impacts  the  revenue  and  cost  of  the  firm.    If  revenue 
increases more than the cost, the currently employed worker will be valued more by the 
firm.  Another way to look at this is that a higher valuation attached to the currently 
employed worker means a higher demand for labour in a tighter labour market.  The   10
equilibrium  match  quality  qt  must  be  lower  in  a  tighter  labour  market  to  make  the 
employed worker more worthwhile.  
 
 
 
Calibration 
 
Parameter Values 
There are eight parameters of interest: a , d , , r  y , 2 s , q  W and a.  Following Prescott 
(1986) I set the benchmark values, a = .36, and d =0.1 (annual data),  96 . = r  and  2 s  is 
fixed at .00763. There is no published estimate of the parameter y . The closest one is the 
average job separation rate of 3% in the US economy over the period 1948-2001 found in 
Hall (2001).   The parameters are  q  and Win (16)  were identified at values equal to .62 
and 1 respectively by running a loglinear regression of real wage index on a moving 
average of the TFP indices.
10   The remaining job posting cost parameter a in equation (2) 
is fixed in such a way that the maximum value of qt equals unity. This means a equals 
1.17. 
 
Trend and Cyclical Components of the Labour Market Frictions  
 
Using the baseline parameter values and the observed series for the TFP,  I next compute 
the series for the Tobin’s Q of a worker  based on (17).  Figure 3 plots the model and 
actual Tobin’s Q of a worker over the entire sample period. The actual Q is the same 
series reported in Figure 1. The model series is normalized at unity for the base year 1992 
to make it comparable to the actual relative price of labour.   The model performs really 
well in tracking down the trend in the Tobin’s Q of the worker.   
                                                 
10Using the Cobb-Douglas production function (1) and the TFP process (5), verify that (16) reduces to: 
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obtain an estimate of q equal to .62, which was significant at 1% level. The constant coefficient was found 
statistically insignificant.  Given that the structural parameters a   r  and d  cannot be zero, I take the 
insignificant k as an evidence that W is close to unity. The R
2 for this real wage regression was .96.    This 
real wage regression simply reconfirms the procyclical behaviour of the US real wage of workers.      11
Figure 5 plots the cyclical components of the model’s Tobin’s Q and actual 
Tobin’s Q of worker.   The cyclical component of the model’s Tobin’s Q is computed by 
plugging the detrended TFP series into equation (17).  The correlation coefficient is 
0.53.
11 Based on the calibrated parameters the model reproduces the procyclical behaviour 
of the value of workers reasonably well.   
<Figure 5 comes here> 
 
An Estimate of the Employer-Worker Match Probability  
In this section, I estimate the match probability qt based on the reduced form equation 
(17).   Figure 5 plots this matching probability and the detrended TFP series which is the 
same as in Figure 3. 
12   
<Figure 5 comes here> 
 
Matching  probability  is  clearly  countercyclical.    The  match  probability  is 
determined  in  equilibrium  by  firms’  valuation  of  the  installed  worker,  which  is  the 
Tobin’s Q of the worker.  The intuition for a higher Tobin’s Q of a worker during an 
expansionary phase goes as follows.  A positive TFP shock at date t triggers an increase in 
capital-employment ratio (kt+1) in the following period (see equation 8).   Due to the 
constant returns to scale property of the production function, a higher kt+1 lowers the 
marginal product of capital at date t+1, and raises the marginal product of a worker.  Thus 
a higher TFP realization today basically signals a higher prospective relative return to 
human capital with respect to physical capital.  In response to this, firms switch gear from 
physical investment to investment in human capital, which means posting more vacancy 
(higher Vt).  This increased demand for workers raises the value of the worker meaning 
lower match quality qt.  Thus in equilibrium a lower unemployment coexists with a lower 
match quality. Basically firms compromise on the quality of the match during a boom 
when the labour market is tight.  
                                                 
11 Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2005) measure labour frictions, which they call labour wedge, in terms of 
an implicit tax on wages.  Their labour wedge also covaries positively with output although for reasons 
fundamentally different from my model.  The labour wedge in their model is equivalent to stickiness of 
wages while in my model the labour wedge is equivalent to a matching friction.   
12 The TFP series is also normalized at unity taking 1992 as the base year.    12
Based on Figure 5 one may note that the matching probability declined during the 
70s and then it revived in the 80s while TFP shows the opposing pattern.  The matching 
probability  increased  during  the  80s  when  there  was  productivity  slowdown.    These 
results reinforce my hypothesis that the quality of the match shows a countercyclical 
pattern.   
 Note that qt also determines the shift of the Beveridge curve (see footnote 5).   
Our results thus also accord well with Valletta (2005) who finds that the US Beveridge 
curve shifted out during the 70s and then shifted back in during the 80s.  In the present 
setting,  the  slope  of  the  Beveridge  curve  is  endogenously  driven  by  the  TFP.    My 
framework shows the direct link between the TFP and the matching probability, which is 
inversely related to labour market frictions.  The reversal of the match probability is 
basically due to the reversal in the TFP movements in the US economy in the 80s.   
 
General equilibrium 
In this paper, I have posed the issue of labour market friction and the related Tobin’s Q of 
worker from a partial equilibrium angle. I only look at the firm’s side of the problem. In a 
general equilibrium, the average quality of the match (the inverse of the Tobin’s Q of the 
worker) is determined by the interaction between firm’s search for the right employee and 
the  household’s  search  for  the  right  match.    In  the  appendix,  I  outline  a  general 
equilibrium version of the model following Merz (1995) and argue that the procyclical 
behavior  of  the  labour  market  friction  is  theoretically  robust.    The  search  friction  is 
modeled as a social planning problem where the planner internalizes both advertisement 
cost and search cost.  A positive TFP shock triggers a wealth effect, which means more 
vacancy  posting  by  the  firms  and  more  search  efforts  by  the  households.    Due  to 
convexity  of  the  search  cost  function,  this  means  a  lower  match  probability  between 
workers and the employees.  
 
5. Conclusion 
There is no consensus whether the labour market friction has increased or decreased in the 
US economy over the last few decades.  The traditional literature identifies labour market 
friction in terms of an upward shift of the Beveridge curve.  In this paper, I question this   13
interpretation of the labour market friction. I take an asset pricing approach to understand 
the friction. Higher friction means a lower match quality, which implies a higher relative 
value of a worker with respect to capital.  Viewed from this perspective, I find that the 
labour market friction has a procyclical pattern.  The increased friction is reflected by a 
lower  match  quality  during  an  expansion.    This  basically  indicates  that  firms  find  it 
difficult to have the right match in an expansionary economy with a tighter labour market.    
Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no conflict between a higher labour market 
friction and lower unemployment.           
 
Appendix A 
Derivation of equation 15 
Conjecture a solution  
) 1 /(
2
) 1 /( 1
1
1 a q a e l e l - - - - = t t t q               (A.1) 
Upon substitution in  (4) and using the geometric lognormal random property of the TFP 
process  } { t e   one obtains: 
) 1 /(
2 2
) 1 /( 1
3 1
) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /(
2
) 1 /( 1
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a q a a q a a q a e l m y r e m l y r e e e l e l - - - - - - - - - + - = - t t t t t t B A
                       (A.2) 
 
 
Using the method of undetermined coefficients it immediately follows that  
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which proves (15). // 
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Appendix B 
Tobin’s Q of a Worker in General Equilibrium 
I consider a social planning problem based on Merz (1995) as follows. The social planner 
chooses consumption (Ct), employment (Nt), unemployment (1-Nt), search intensity (St) 
and job vacancies (Vt)  posted per firm to solve the following maximization problem:  
)] ( ) ( [
0
0 t t
t
t N W C U E - ∑
¥
=
r     
 
s.t.  
t t t t t t Y aV N S c I C = + - + + ) 1 )( (  : Resource constraint  (B.1) 
 
) , ( t t t t N K F Y e =   :   Production function      (B.2) 
 
t I t K t K + - = + ) 1 ( 1 d : Law of motion of physical capital  (B.3)   
 
t M t N t N + - = + ) 1 ( 1 y : Law of Motion of Employment   (B.4) 
 
[ ]l l ) 1 ( 1
t N t S t V t M - - =  ,  1 0 < < l :  Matching Function   (B.5) 
 
K0, N0 = given             (B.6) 
 
All the notations are the same as before except St and Mt which stand for household’s 
search  intensity  and  the  extent  of  matching  between  workers  and  firms.  The  cost  of 
worker’s search is represented by the function  ) ( t S c  which satisfies the properties that 
0 ) ( ' > t S c  and  . 0 ) ( ' ' > t S c   The social planner internalizes both these  costs which explains 
the  resource  constraint  (B.1)  facing  the  planner.  Equation  (B.5)  represents  a  standard 
Pissarides (1985) type matching technology, which means that the quality of the match 
between employers and the workers depends on the interaction between search intensities 
of  firms  and  workers.    The  social  planner  instantaneous  felicity  function  represents    15
household’s utility function of consumption, U(Ct),  and disutility function of work, V(Nt).  
  
Our central concern here is about the Tobin’s Q of the worker which is the inverse 
of the search quality qt . At the optimum, it can be rewritten as:  
t M
t V
t q
=
1                (B.7) 
It is straightforward to verify that a key first order condition must hold equating the ratio 
of  marginal  products  of  search  and  advertisements  to  the  ratio  of  the  corresponding 
marginal costs. In other words, at the optimum we must have:  
a
t N t S c
t V t M
t S t M ) 1 )( ( '
/
/ -
=
¶ ¶
¶ ¶          (B.8) 
 
using (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7), it is straightforward to verify that  
l
l
l
 

 
 -
=
a
t S c
t q
) ( ' ) 1 ( 1           (B.9) 
 
Given the convexity of the search cost function, the Tobin’s Q of the worker positively 
correlates with worker’s search intensity.  Following Merz (1995), one can argue that a 
positive  technology  shock  via  a  positive  resource  wealth  effect  creates  congestion  by 
raising the search intensity (St) of workers. This raises the Tobin’s Q of worker in a 
general equilibrium.      16
Figure 1: Relative Price of Investment Goods with Respect 
Consumption Goods
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Figure 2: Relative Price of a Worker in terms of Capital 
Goods
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Figure 3: Relative Price of Worker and the TFP
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Figure 4: Value of  Worker: Model vs Actual 
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Figure 5: Cyclical Components of Model and 
Actual Tobin's Q of Worker
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1
9
4
8
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
6
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
6
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
6
2
0
0
0
Year
Model Tobin's Q
Actual Tobin's Q
 
 
Figure 6: TFP and the Matching Probability
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